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PETER JUNGER: SCHOLAR AND
STYLIST
Jonathan L. Entint
Peter Junger once described himself as a little fox.1 This was not,
as those who knew him will attest, a reference to his physical size, nor
was it his way of identifying with the animal at the center of Pierson
v. Post,2 the great Property case that he taught for so many years,
although Peter almost certainly had more sympathy for that creature
than he did for either of the parties. Instead, the reference was
intellectual: to the breadth of vulpine knowledge (as in Isaiah Berlin's
notion that foxes "pursue many ends, often unrelated and even
contradictory"3). And it was surely accurate, because Peter knew a lot
about many things.
I first heard of Peter Junger while working on my law review Note,
several years before I had any contact with the Case Western Reserve
University School of Law.4 I was writing about the federal
government's effort to suppress the publication of a magazine article
about the hydrogen bomb. This came less than a decade after the
Pentagon Papers case, in which the government sought to suppress
the publication of newspaper articles about a classified study of
American involvement in the Vietnam War, and Peter had published a
provocative article on that case.6 It was one of the first law review
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law and Political Science, Case
Western Reserve University.
I Peter Junger, A Fox Interprets the Hedgehog, IN BRIEF, Jan. 1987, at 5.
2 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
3 ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox 1 (1953), quoted in Junger, supra note
1, at 5.
4 Jonathan L. Entin, Note, United States v. Progressive, Inc.: The Faustian Bargain and
the First Amendment, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 538 (1980).
5 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
6 Peter D. Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 23 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 3 (1971).
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articles analyzing the decision, and it is still attracting attention.7
Because there was very little jurisprudence about national security
and the First Amendment, I had to pay attention to what Peter had to
say. As usual, he had his own distinctive take on this high-profile
case, and he made his point in a distinctive way that reflected his
extraordinary knowledge and his remarkable flair for the English
language. Here is how Peter began Down Memory Lane: The Case of
the Pentagon Papers:
It is a thing of memories, the case. Not necessarily real
memories; they could just as well be ersatz recollections of
some penny-dreadful smoked out of the collective
unconscious of sixty years ago. It is not really our sort of
case, or not predominately, and it hardly belongs in these
pages. It is another sort, the case of the Pentagon Papers.
The decision of the Supreme Court in New York Times
Co. v. United States is surplusage, an epilogue inserted in the
saga solely for verisimilitude, or to give it a medicinal touch
of redeeming social interest. At least that was my first
impression although, of course, it alludes to many half-
forgotten things of perhaps more substance than The Four
Just Men or The Purloined Letter. Undoubtedly because of
this allusiveness, as well as the hysterical publicity which the
press applies to its own affairs, one can foresee a plethora of
articles discussing the implications of the case.
But let me, by way of prologue, make one thing clear.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in dissent, prefaced his opinion with these
words of Mr. Justice Holmes: "Great cases like hard cases
make bad law." I trust that it is not presumptuous for me to
point out a fact of which I am sure Mr. Justice Harlan was
well aware and in which he found much consolation: the case
of the Pentagon Papers is not, in any lawyer's sense, a great
case and it did not make any law at all, good or bad. The
Republic has stood for 180 years since the adoption of the
first amendment without a judicial determination of the
power of the Federal Government to impose prior restraints
upon newspapers, and with luck it will still stand in 2151
without such a determination. Some precedents are
7 See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES-
COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 318 (4th ed. 2006).
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unnecessary, however much writers in law reviews might
yearn for them.8
About fifteen pages later, Peter provided the following epigram
that elegantly captured his view of the case: "[I]f Shelley v. Kraemer
is properly called the 'Finnegan's Wake of Constitutional Law,' New
York Times Co. v. United States may well be its Rorschach blot."9 For
him, the Pentagon Papers case did not really turn on the First
Amendment, but rather on separation of powers. As he put it in
searching for a "neutral principle" to explain the result: "The doctrine
of the separation of powers denies the Executive the constitutional
power to take action on his own authority if that action is one which
would be of doubtful constitutionality had it been authorized by
Congress."1°
Like most constitutional scholars, I am inclined to believe that one
can extract a clearer First Amendment principle from the seriatim
opinions in the case than Peter did. Still, as I pointed out in my Note,
the district court in the H-bomb case emphasized that Congress had in
fact authorized injunctions under the Atomic Energy Act to prevent
the dissemination of sensitive nuclear information and that a
plausible, although to my mind ultimately unpersuasive, argument
could be made that this statutory provision resolved the separation of
powers concerns that Peter had identified in his article." We will
never know who was correct, because the H-bomb litigation
ultimately fell apart when much of the same information appeared
independently in an underground newspaper that was handed out on
the steps of the federal courthouse where the case was initially
heard. 12 In the end, though, Peter's iconoclasm and his stylistic
elegance made a profound impression on me.
Those qualities are abundantly reflected in his almost legendary
critique of the law-and-economics approach to water pollution. He
began this way:
In the twelfth regnal year of King Richard II, Parliament
declared:
For that so much Dung and Filth of the Garbage
and Intrails as well of beasts killed, as of other
S Junger, supra note 6, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).
9 Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
10 Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted).
I Entin, supra note 4, at 544, 563-65.
12 Id at 541 n.11.
2008]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Corruptions, be cast and put in Ditches, Rivers, and
other Waters, and also within many other Places,
within, about, and nigh unto divers Cities, Boroughs,
and Towns of the Realm, and the Suburbs of them,
that the Air there is greatly corrupt and infect, and
many Maladies and other intolerable Diseases do
daily happen. . . . [And therefore decreed] that all
they which do cast and lay all such Annoyances,
Dung, Garbages, Intrails, and other Ordure in
Ditches, Rivers, Waters, and other Places aforesaid,
shall cause utterly to be removed, avoided, and
carried away betwixt this and the Feast of St. Michael
next ensuing after the End of this present Parliament,
every one upon Pain to lose and to forfeit to our Lord
the King [E20].
To ensure that the waters of England would remain pure, the
statute further provided that no one thereafter should throw or
cast any such annoyances into the waters, and anyone who
did was to be "punished after the Discretion of the
Chancellor."
It was a nice try, but nothing came of it. King Richard got
involved in the War of the Roses and finally, in the reign of
Queen Victoria, the statute was repealed along with a number
of others which had ceased to be in force. Despite various
legislative attempts and judicial inventions, the United States
has never had, at least until the passage of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, any body of
federal law that was more effective in controlling water
pollution than the Statute of Richard II. It is not clear even
now that we have an effective pollution control law, but at
least we have the legislative scaffolding upon which such a
law can be built.
13
More than 330 pages later, he concluded:
It may be difficult to take into account in a mathematical
analysis that "[n]o man is an Iland, intire of itselfe," but we
know it to be true. If we deny our natures in pursuit of a
13 Peter D. Junger, A Recipe for Bad Water: Welfare Economics and Nuisance Law Mixed
Well, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 3, 3-5 (1976) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 12 Rich. I1 c. 13
(1388) (brackets in original)).
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Pareto optimum, we shall pay a grievous price. Everyone may
even be worse off. And as to the waters:
"By the rivers of Babylon there we sat down,
yea, we wept."'
14
Peter's skepticism about the economic analysis of law made him
the perfect foil to Judge Richard Posner, the great proponent of that
approach, who gave the Sumner Canary lecture in 1986.1' At the
dean's request, Peter wrote a response to Judge Posner. That was the
piece in which he described himself as a fox, in contrast to "the Great
Hedgehog," Posner, who knew "the [one] Great Thing.' 16 In the end,
Peter reported himself "delighted that the greatest of our hedgehogs
does see that interpretation can be a problem-and a necessity-for a
judge, that the life of the law is more than mathematics.'' 17
As the excerpts I have shared with you suggest, Peter had a
remarkable intellectual curiosity and a memorable prose style.
Unfortunately, some of his best stuff never made it into print. Take
his wonderful piece, "The Original Plain Meaning of the Right to
Bear Arms," written several years before the recent revival of
academic interest in the Second Amendment. 18 Anticipating Sanford
Levinson, Peter described that ambiguous provision as an
"embarrassment," 19 although he came up with a more concrete
meaning for it than Levinson has ever done. Rejecting the interpretive
approaches of such leading theorists as Ronald Dworkin, Richard
Epstein, and Laurence Tribe, Peter traced the Second Amendment
right to bear arms to the English Court of Chivalry and concluded that
"the 'right to bear arms' is the same as the right to display armorial
bearings, and that the original plain meaning of the Second
Amendment is that the government shall not infringe upon one's right
to be a lady or a gentleman., 20 Indeed, he inferred, this disputed
provision "so skillfully avoids the use of sexist language . .. that,
14 Id. at 335 (quoting John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions XVI, quoted in
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 760 n.2 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (brackets in
original); and Psalms 137 (King James)).
15 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179 (1986-87).
16 Junger, supra note 1, at 5.
17 Id. at 8.
18 Working Paper 08-01, Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=- 1082417.
'9 Id. at 1, 4, 5. Cf Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 637 (1989) (probably the first chapter in the modem flood of Second Amendment legal
scholarship).
Id at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
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rather than a barbarous anachronism, it is one of the most principled
provisions of the pre-Civil War Constitution.",21 In short, "since a well
regulated militia requires officers, and officers must be gentlemen, the
framers intended to preserve the gentry from the leveling tendencies
of the masses. 22 If only the Supreme Court had access to this
analysis amid the torrent of briefs in its recent gun-control case,
District of Columbia v. Heller.23
One reason that Peter never published this Second Amendment
piece might be that by then he had gotten deeply involved with
computers, both as a programmer and as a lawyer. He later explained
that some of his fascination was stimulated by a Robert Heinlein
novel that he read in law school. In Heinlein's world the laws of
physics had given way to the laws of magic, but law practice was
unaffected: "It turns out that we had been practicing magic all the
time., 24 Years later, as a senior professor, Peter mused that "[t]he
newly ubiquitous computer is only the latest example of technology
that can assist us in our magical practice, in our manipulation of texts
and information, and that can also disenable us." The point was clear:
"If we are going to rely on magic, we really ought to understand it."
25
He even mused about some intellectual property issues relating to
computers and before his death had posted on his website a
substantial manuscript arguing that "Patenting Software Is Wrong. 26
Peter's interest in computers and the law led him to return to some
of the issues raised by the Pentagon Papers, showing that what goes
around comes around. He taught a course that was designed to teach
law students about computers, which in turn led him into conflict with
the federal government and ultimately into court. Few law professors
ever become litigants, and Peter was remarkable even in that narrow
domain. But it is not for me to tell that story. The person who really
knows those details is Peter's friend and lawyer, Gino Scarselli
21 Id. at 6.
22 Id. (footnotes omitted).
23 No. 07-290 (U.S. argued Mar. 18, 2008).
24 Peter D. Junger, The View from Nowhere, IN BRIEF, Jan. 1995, at 4, 4.
25 Id. at 5.
26 Peter D. Junger, You Can't Patent Software: Patenting Software Is Wrong, 58 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 333 (2007).
27 Gino J. Scarselli, Tribute To Professor Peter Junger, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 325
(2007).
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